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Case Note 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMON INTENTION 
Lee Chez Kee v PP 
[2008] 3 SLR 447 
The Court of Appeal recently delivered an important 
judgment on liability for common intention. This criminal 
law doctrine has demanded clarification for some time, 
especially in regards to what is commonly known as “twin 
crime” situations, ie, situations where there is a primary 
criminal act as well as a collateral criminal act incidental to 
the main goal of the participants to the primary crime. In the 
“twin crime” situation, the participants would have intended 
to commit the primary criminal act but not all would have 
shared in the intention of one or more unidentified members 
of the group to also commit the collateral criminal act. This 
note considers if the court came to an appropriate conclusion 
on the law. 
Nathaniel Yong-Ern KHNG 
LLB (Hons) (University of Melbourne); 
Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore. 
CHEN Siyuan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); 
Lecturer of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 The law on criminal liability for common intention has long 
been contentious in Singapore,1 even with many decades of judicial 
interpretation of the concept. The much-maligned s 34 of the of the 
Penal Code,2 Singapore’s statutory foundation for criminal liability for 
common intention, states: 
34. When a criminal act is done by several persons, in 
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is 
                                                                       
1 Professor Michael Hor, for instance, described the doctrine of common intention 
as “one of the most puzzling doctrines in criminal law today”: see Michael Hor, 
“Common Intention and the Enterprise of Constructing Criminal Liability” (1999) 
Sing JLS 494 at 494. 
2 Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed. 
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liable for that act in the same manner as if the act were done by him 
alone. 
2 Liability for common intention under s 34 has often been 
invoked by the Prosecution for what is commonly known as “twin 
crime” situations, ie, situations where there is a primary crime as well as 
a collateral criminal act incidental to the main goal of the participants to 
the primary criminal act. In the “twin crime” situation, the participants 
would have intended to commit the primary criminal act but not all – 
those who may be described as “secondary offenders” – would have 
shared in the intention of one or more unidentified members of the 
group – those who may be described as “primary offenders” – to also 
commit the collateral criminal act. More often than not, twin crime 
situations that are prosecuted would be crimes of violence culminating 
in murder. In such cases, s 34 would affix liability on participants who 
claim to only have had the mens rea to the common initial violent crime 
(such as robbery) but not the ensuing murder. In cases where the 
evidence is inconclusive as to which member of a group inflicted the 
fatal wound, s 34 has been invoked as well. While a draconian 
interpretation of s 34 can be justified on the policy of deterring (and 
indeed punishing) group crimes of violence, as once opined, “it is 
certainly inequitable from the offender’s point of view, if he has to be 
put in peril of a conviction of murder for participating in a crime 
without contemplating the possibility of a killing in the course of it”.3 
3 The Court of Appeal recently delivered an important judgment 
on s 34 in Lee Chez Kee v PP.4 Although the judgment also accorded 
substantial treatment to the issue of the admissibility of statements 
pursuant to s 378(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code,5 this note 
focuses solely on the subject of common intention. To that end, it 
considers whether the unhappy spectre over this area of criminal law has 
now been properly laid to rest. Before that, however, a summary of the 
facts and findings of Lee Chez Kee v PP is apposite. 
II. Facts 
4 On 14 December 1993, the police found the body of the 
deceased (“D”) in his house which appeared to have been ransacked. 
D was found with a pillow over his face. His wrists were tied together 
                                                                       
3 M Sornarajah, “Common Intention and Murder under the Penal Codes” (1995) 
Sing JLS 29 at 32. 
4 [2008] 3 SLR 447. The judgment referred to is the leading judgment of 
V K Rajah JA. Although the other two judges who made up the Coram, Choo Han 
Teck J and Woo Bih Li J, delivered separate judgments, they concurred with 
Rajah JA’s views on s 34. 
5 Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed. 
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with an electrical cord, and his feet bound by a belt. Another electrical 
cord was found across the front of his neck. A bent knife was found 
beneath his body, and a chopper was also found in the hall. In total, 18 
external injuries (including stab wounds) were caused to D. The cause of 
death was asphyxia due to strangulation; the stab wounds were not 
acutely fatal. After the robbery, D’s cash-on-line (“COL”) card was used 
to make multiple bank withdrawals and purchases. 
5 Three people were involved in the robbery-cum-murder: Too 
Yin Sheong, Ng Chek Siong and the appellant, Lee Chez Kee. Too and 
Ng were convicted in 1998. Too was convicted of murder, and Ng was 
convicted of robbery, theft and cheating, all with common intention. 
Lee was only arrested in 2006 and his trial proceeded without the oral 
testimonies of Too and Ng as the former had been sentenced to suffer 
death and had been executed and the latter had been repatriated. 
6 Too had befriended D at a coffee shop some time in 1993. Their 
friendship grew. One day, Too accepted his invitation to visit his house. 
However, after D had showed Too the valuable antiques in his house, he 
started touching the latter’s body and thighs. Too felt uneasy and left. He 
then met up with his friends, Ng and Lee, and they came up with a plan 
to rob D at his house. The original plan was to tie D up and threaten 
him with a knife. Ng, however, volunteered only to drive them to 
D’s house. 
7 On 12 December 1993, the trio carried out their plan. Too had 
called D on the pretext of wanting to introduce a friend to him. 
D agreed to meet them. Lee was extremely worried from the outset 
about being arrested after the robbery, given that D was seemingly well 
acquainted with Too. Lee even quarrelled with Too en route to D’s house, 
but decided to carry on with the robbery nonetheless. Upon reaching 
the house, Too and Lee chatted with D over drinks. What happened after 
that was the subject of conflicting accounts. 
8 Too said that when D chatted with Lee, he slipped into the 
kitchen and found himself a knife. When he returned, Lee brandished 
his knife. Too did likewise and they demanded information from D as to 
where they could get money. They took D to the second storey and tied 
him up in his room and ransacked the house. Before they left, Lee 
stabbed D. The knife did not penetrate well so he used a cord to strangle 
him. Lee only released his grip after D began frothing at the mouth. Too 
and Lee continued searching for valuables and, at some point, Lee hit 
D’s head. Too and Lee then left the house. 
9 Lee’s account differed. According to him, while Lee was chatting 
with D, Too had taken a knife from the kitchen and passed it to him, 
whereupon he used it to threaten D. D struggled, and Lee stabbed his 
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abdominal region twice, but the knife did not penetrate successfully. He 
also rained a few blows on D. After that, Too and Lee led D upstairs to a 
bedroom. They tied him up. Lee ransacked the house while Too 
remained in the room. Lee eventually went downstairs, and on his way, 
he saw Too covering D’s face with a pillow. Ng came into the house to 
search for more valuables before the trio escaped. 
10 After the robbery, D’s COL card was used to make multiple 
bank withdrawals and purchases. At no point after leaving D’s house did 
Lee ask Too what happened to D or discuss with him what they would 
do if D freed himself. 
III. The trial judge’s views on liability under s 34 
11 The Court of Appeal provided a succinct summary on the trial 
judge’s views on liability for common intention under s 34 of the Penal 
Code:6 
34 … First, the trial judge stated that the evidence, considered in 
its totality, gave rise to the irresistible inference that [D] had been 
murdered in furtherance of the common intention among Too, [Lee] 
and Ng to commit robbery … To begin with, the Prosecution had 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that [D] had died as a result of 
asphyxiation with the black cord and, further, that the event of 
strangulation had occurred in the course of the robbery committed on 
the material date. 
35 … The trial judge placed considerable emphasis on the events 
which had occurred after the robbery … Apart from [Lee’s] own 
admission that he had shared in the spoils of the robbery, the trial 
judge accepted that the independent evidence adduced by the 
Prosecution also identified [Lee] as having been party to the 
subsequent usage of [D’s] COL card … 
36 In the trial judge’s view, this inference was also supported by 
the events which had taken place before the robbery …: 
On [Lee’s] own admission, he was, prior to the robbery, 
afraid of being recognised … These fears were sufficiently 
compelling to cause [Lee] to get into a quarrel … 
… The complete lack of any discussion regarding what would 
happen when [D] was freed, coupled with the calm and 
calculated manner in which they went about repeatedly 
exploiting [D’s] COL card … could only support the 
conclusion that [Lee] and his accomplices were not worried 
about being identified because they knew [D] was dead. 
                                                                       
6 Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed; Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [34]–[40]. 
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37 … [The trial judge], however, did not yet find that [Lee] had 
in fact inflicted the fatal strangulation … [Lee’s] evidence at trial that 
he had merely observed Too placing the pillow on [D’s] face from a 
distance while he was going downstairs was clearly inconsistent with 
his prior evidence … 
… 
39 … the trial judge stated that, in his view, it was not necessary 
to establish the identity of the person who actually strangled [D] as 
the requirements of s 34 were satisfied … 
40 … the trial judge also opined that even if one were to accept 
that it was Too, and not [Lee], who was solely responsible for [D’s] 
death, the rest of the evidence showed that Too’s conduct to this effect 
was in furtherance of their common intention to rob [D] … 
[emphasis in original] 
IV. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
12 The Court of Appeal dismissed Lee’s appeal, but applied a 
markedly different interpretation of s 34 of the Penal Code,7 with 
particular attention paid to “twin crime” situations.8 It observed that 
there was little difficulty in relation to “single crime” situations, as in 
such situations, the parties to the enterprise would all share the 
common intention to commit the criminal act that was eventually 
perpetuated even though only one or more of them may have physically 
perpetuated the offence itself. Section 34 would clearly apply to render 
all the participants criminally liable if it could be established that the 
remaining participants participated in the criminal act. In contrast, in a 
“twin crime” situation, the participants would have intended to commit 
a primary criminal act but not all of the participants (ie, the secondary 
offenders) would not have shared in the intention of one or more 
unidentified members of the group (ie, the primary offenders) to also 
commit a collateral criminal act incidental to the main goal of the 
participants. 
13 In postulating the correct interpretation of s 34, the court re-
examined what it perceived to be the four elements for liability for 
common intention under s 34 to be established: (a) a criminal act; 
(b) participation in the doing of the act; (c) a common intention 
between the parties; and (d) an act done in furtherance of that common 
intention. Summarily, the following “restatements” on s 34 were made: 
                                                                       
7 Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed. 
8 The appeal was dismissed by a majority (Choo Han Teck J dissenting) although all 
three judges were ad idem on the interpretation of s 34. 
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(a) “Criminal act” refers to all the acts done by the persons 
involved which cumulatively result in the criminal offence in 
question. It does not only refer to the actual crime committed.9 
(b) Presence at the scene of the criminal act, whether the 
situation is a single or twin crime situation, need not be strictly 
insisted on – the key is participation, but participation in the 
primary criminal act suffices for liability to fix.10 
(c) To infer common intention, it must be shown that the 
criminal act was done pursuant to a pre-arranged plan, 
although it is possible to form a common intention just before 
the offence is committed. The circumstances that can lead to an 
inference of a common intention are non-exhaustive and cover 
both the antecedent and subsequent conduct of the parties.11 
(d) The secondary offender must subjectively know that 
one in his party may likely commit the collateral offence in 
furtherance of the common intention of carrying out the 
primary offence.12 
14 A preliminary point ought to be made at this juncture. 
Section 34, if constructed literally, may not arguably break down into the 
four elements as propounded by the court. However, on a closer perusal 
of s 34, the semantic differences cannot be said to be material.13 The 
restatements on s 34 will now be considered in seriatim. 
V. Dissecting the elements for liability under s 34 
A. A criminal act 
15 The first element concerns the question of what constitutes a 
“criminal act”. The court emphasised that “criminal act” in this context 
does not refer solely to the actual offence committed; the term “offence” 
was distinguished from an “act” with reference made to s 40 of the Penal 
Code, which states that the former “denotes a thing made punishable by 
this Code”.14 Reference was also made to the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 
1860) which stated that the expression “criminal act” encompasses the 
whole of the criminal enterprise in which the parties engage themselves 
                                                                       
9 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [137]. 
10 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [146]–[147] and [157]. 
11 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [161]. 
12 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [253]. 
13 See also Yeo, Morgan & Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore 
(LexisNexis, 2007) at para 35.14. 
14 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [136]. 
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by virtue of their common intention,15 and Barendra Kumar Ghosh v 
Emperor (“Barendra Kumar”) which stated that a “criminal act” refers to 
the “unity of criminal behaviour” that results in an outcome for which 
an individual would be punished if he had done it alone.16 
16 The authors are of the opinion that the court rightly adopted 
the established view.17 It is important to remember too that it is not 
necessary for the conduct of each party to the criminal act to be the 
same. The “criminal act” may consist of different acts, as would be the 
case for a gang rape where one person rapes the victim while the others 
keep watch, or housebreaking where some persons conduct the actual 
burglary and others act as lookouts. As stated pithily in Barendra 
Kumar:18 
It is impossible to conceive two individuals doing identically the same 
act. Such a thing is impossible. Therefore to have any meaning, the 
expression ‘criminal act done by several persons’ must contemplate an 
act which can be divided into parts each part being executed by a 
different person, the whole making up the criminal act which was the 
common intention of all. To put it in another way the one criminal act 
may be regarded as made up of a number of acts done by the 
individual conspirators, the result of their individual acts being the 
criminal act which was the common intention of them all. 
B. Participation in the criminal act 
17 The second element is that the criminal act must be done by 
several persons. Two apparent propositions emerge. First, if the criminal 
act is done by one person, s 34 would not apply, even if it consists of a 
series of acts. Secondly, the criminal act must be “done” by the parties; 
ie, each party who is made liable under s 34 must have participated in 
the criminal act. It was rightly observed that the mere agreement 
between parties to commit a certain criminal act would not be enough 
for the purposes of s 34.19 Instead, such persons may be committing 
criminal conspiracy, but they would not fall foul of s 34.20 
18 The court then noted that past cases were divided on the issue 
of what constitutes participation.21 Some cases have held that 
participation can be active or passive, and where participation is passive, 
                                                                       
15 W W Chitaley & VB Bakhale, The Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) vol 1 (The All 
India Reporter Ltd, 3rd Ed, 1980) at p 160. 
16 AIR 1925 PC 1 at 9. 
17 See also Yeo, Morgan & Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore 
(LexisNexis, 2007) at para 35.15. 
18 Emperor v Barendra Kumar Ghose AIR 1924 Cal 257 at 312. 
19 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [138]. 
20 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [138]. 
21 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [139]. 
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mere presence suffices. Recent cases such as PP v Gerardine Andrew,22 
however, propagated the view that presence is the only possible 
indication of participation rather than only being indicative of 
participation. 
19 After surveying the case law, the court held that presence at the 
scene of the criminal act should not be insisted upon, regardless of 
whether it is a single or “twin crime” situation.23 The key issue is whether 
there was participation, not presence, and participation need not always 
be established by way of physical presence; whether there was 
participation should be a question of fact in each case as to whether the 
accused person had participated to such a degree that he could be 
deemed to be as blameworthy as the primary offender.24 
20 In that connection, the court referred to the Malaysian Court of 
Appeal case of Sabarudin bin Non v PP, wherein it was said:25 
In our judgment, presence in every case is not necessary for s 34 to 
apply. In our judgment, s 34 should be interpreted having regard to 
modern technological advances. The early decisions on the section, 
admittedly by the Privy Council, that held presence to be essential for 
s 34 to bite were handed down at a time when modes of 
communication were not as advanced as today. It would, in our 
judgment, be a perversion of justice if we are required to cling on to 
an interpretation of the section made at a time when science was at a 
very early stage of development. 
21 It is undoubtedly true that modern science has reached the stage 
where assistance can be easily given to the perpetrating of an offence 
from afar. The old view, that presence is a requirement for finding 
participation, may lead to injustice in certain scenarios. There was a 
recent case where a person planned a robbery but engaged three persons 
to carry it out.26 Express instructions were given to the three robbers to 
beat the deceased, a lorry driver for a delivery company, till he was 
unconscious. The deceased was eventually beaten with a baseball bat at 
the scene of the robbery. The planner met up with the three robbers 
shortly after the victim had been beaten to assist in transporting away 
some of the loot. While this was going on, the deceased lay dying in his 
lorry. The three robbers were charged with murder committed in the 
furtherance of a common intention. The planner, whose culpability may 
well be viewed as equally high, was charged with, inter alia, abetting 
armed robbery with hurt, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment 
                                                                       
22 [1998] 3 SLR 736. 
23 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [147]. 
24 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [146]. 
25 [2005] 4 MLJ 37 at [31]. 
26 PP v Daniel Vijay s/o Katherasan [2008] SGHC 120. 
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and 24 strokes of the cane for that charge.27 It can be safely assumed that 
one of the major reasons as to why the planner did not face a similar 
capital charge as the robbers was the fact that he was not present at the 
scene of the robbery. Now that presence explicitly need not be 
established for participation to be found, the requirement of 
participation may be met in cases similar to that of the planner; thus, 
the possibility of such travesties of justice occurring in the future may 
be ameliorated. 
22 Having said that, caution should be exercised in drawing an 
inference of participation where there is no presence. The basis of 
liability for common intention includes the fact that accomplices assist 
the perpetration of the criminal act in question in no small way by 
giving the main perpetrator support and encouragement. In most cases, 
this would be where the accomplice was present at the scene of the 
criminal act. As stated in Too Yin Sheong v PP, “the presence of 
accomplices gives encouragement, support and protection to the person 
actually committing the act” [emphasis added].28 Drawing from the 
foregoing, however, the threshold for a finding of participation where 
there is no presence should also be fixed to situations where there is 
encouragement, support or protection. 
23 The court then opined that PP v Gerardine Andrew29 wrongly 
decided that there was a need for participation in the collateral criminal 
act as well as in the primary criminal act.30 It held that an insistence on 
participation in the collateral criminal act is likely to mean that the 
common intenders all intended the commission of the collateral 
criminal act in the first place.31 Accordingly, participation in the primary 
criminal act would be sufficient for liability to be found.32 
24 With respect, whether participation in a collateral criminal act 
is indicative of the common intenders having intended the commission 
of the collateral criminal act in the first place would depend on the facts 
or how wide participation is construed. If the secondary offenders 
joined the first perpetrator in stabbing a victim, then it is likely that they 
had intended the commission of the collateral criminal act from the 
outset. However, it is hard to see how a lookout for a robbery, who by 
his role can also be construed as participating in the collateral criminal 
act, can be said conclusively to have intended the commission of the 
collateral criminal act such as murder from the outset, without more. 
                                                                       
27 PP v Arsan s/o Krishnasamy Govindarajoo (Criminal Case No 16 of 2007). 
28 [1999] 1 SLR 682 at [27]. 
29 [1998] 3 SLR 736. 
30 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [157]. 
31 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [157]. 
32 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [157]. 
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25 Notwithstanding that, there is no apparent reason to say that 
the court was wrong in its opinion that no participation in the collateral 
act is required. The wording of s 34 indicates that the participation 
required is participation in the “criminal act”. If the established view is 
that a “criminal act” refers to all the acts done by the persons involved 
which cumulatively result in the criminal offence in question, it follows 
that participation in the primary act would be sufficient for there to be 
liability under s 34. In this regard, it must also be remembered that s 34 
punishes a person for his participation in the “unity of criminal 
behaviour” rather than his participation in discrete acts. 
C. Proving common intention 
26 This element is fairly uncontroversial. It is apposite to begin 
with the court’s prefatory statement:33 
Common intention refers to the common design of two or more 
persons acting together. It is the reason or object for doing the acts 
forming the criminal act. This is different from the intention to 
commit the offence which is the result of the criminal act committed. 
[emphasis in original] 
27 The court examined the jurisprudential history and concluded 
that this aspect of s 34 was well settled. In the earlier days, to infer 
common intention, one had to prove that the criminal act was done 
pursuant to a pre-arranged plan.34 As the cases developed, the view was 
that common intention could also be formed: (a) only a moment before 
the commission of the offence; (b) on the spot; or (c) during the course 
of the commission of the offence.35 
28 The court noted, however, that in most situations, it is “virtually 
impossible to directly prove a pre-arranged plan between the parties”.36 
While the usual circumstances that can lead to the inference of common 
intention are the (antecedent and subsequent) conduct of the parties, 
the weapons used and the nature of the wounds inflicted, these 
circumstances are non-exhaustive. The totality of the circumstances 
must be considered in determining whether there was a common 
intention.37 At the same time, an inference of common intention should 
not be made unless it is “a necessary inference deducible from the 
circumstances of the case”.38 
                                                                       
33 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [158]. 
34 Mahbub Shah v Emperor AIR (32) 1945 PC 118. 
35 Bashir v State AIR (40) 1953 All 668 at [13]. 
36 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [161]. 
37 Ram Tehal v State of UP AIR 1972 SC 254 at 257. 
38 Mahbub Shah v Emperor AIR (32) 1945 PC 118 at 121. 
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29 One point which the court did not touch upon though is the 
possibility of conflating same and/or similar intention with common 
intention. Eminent Indian publicists have written:39 
Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with 
common intention; the partition which divides their bounds is often 
very thin, nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial and if 
overlooked will result is miscarriage of justice. The plan need not be 
elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required. It could arise and be 
formed suddenly. But there must be pre-arrangement and 
premeditated concert. 
30 A simple example of a situation where there may be same or 
similar intention but no common intention is where members of a mob 
come together with weapons. Each member of the mob may have the 
intention to kill, but none may have a common intention as required as 
there was no pre-arranged plan. In such an instance, “each is 
individually liable for the injury he … caused but he … cannot be held 
vicariously liable for the injuries inflicted by the acts of the others”.40 
D. Common intention in “twin crime” situations 
31 The court identified two problems in the final element of s 34. It 
first noted that the issue of the mental state of the secondary offender in 
a “twin crime” situation has troubled courts in the past.41 Locally, 
however, the position has remained rather stable. The second problem 
was identifying “when it can be said that the collateral offence is in 
furtherance of the common intention”.42 
32 Regarding liability for common intention in “twin crime” 
situations, the court observed that in the first important reported ruling 
in Singapore relating to liability for common intention, Rex v Vincent 
Banka,43 it was held that “there must exist a common intention to 
commit the crime actually committed, and it is not sufficient that there 
should be merely a common intention to ‘behave criminally’”.44 Thus, in 
a robbery-murder situation, the common intention must not merely be 
to commit robbery, but murder as well. Not long after, it was decided in 
Rex v Chhui Yi that an accused can be liable for the murder committed 
                                                                       
39 Justice Y V Chandrachud & V R Manohar, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Indian Penal 
Code (Wadhwa and Company, 31st Ed, 2006) at p 134. 
40 Yeo, Morgan & Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2007) 
at para 35.21. 
41 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [162]. 
42 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [175]. 
43 [1936] MLJ 53 at 56. 
44 See also Yeo, Morgan & Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore 
(LexisNexis, 2007) at para 35.26. 
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by his confederates even if he did not intend the consequences, provided 
that he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.45 
33 Mimi Wong v PP,46 however, set a new precedent for years to 
come. Wong was a waitress who came to know a Japanese engineer, 
Watanabe, and they became intimate. Subsequently, Watanabe’s wife 
arrived in Singapore. Two weeks later, she was stabbed and killed by 
Wong. Wong’s husband assisted in this crime by throwing detergent in 
her eyes; it was his idea to throw the detergent. He was charged with 
having the common intention to murder. The Court of Appeal held that 
the common intention need not be the intention to commit the 
criminal act constituting the offence actually committed. Rather, as long 
as the intention of the primary offender was consistent with the 
common intention of the secondary offenders, all will be liable for the 
eventual criminal act committed.47 The court provided the following 
illustration:48 
… if A and B form a common intention to cause injury to C with a 
knife and A holds C while B stabs deliberately in the region of the 
heart and the stab wound is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature 
to cause death, B is clearly guilty of murder. Applying s 34 it is also 
clear that B’s act in stabbing C is in furtherance of the common 
intention to cause injury to C with a knife because B’s act is clearly 
consistent with the carrying out of that common intention and as 
their ‘criminal act’, ie that unity of criminal behaviour, resulted in the 
criminal offence of murder punishable under s 302. A is also guilty of 
murder. 
34 The preponderance of cases thereafter followed the so-called 
wider interpretation of s 34 laid down in Mimi Wong v PP.49 The court 
in Lee Chez Kee v PP, however, was cognisant that objections against 
Mimi Wong v PP have been raised by Professor Michael Hor in his 
writings. Specifically, he wrote that: 
(a) Sections 34 and 3550 of the Penal Code must be read 
together. The latter provides that the common intender is only 
liable if he possessed “such knowledge or intention”, thus 
contradicting Mimi Wong v PP. 
                                                                       
45 [1936] MLJ 142 at 144, eg, where a “secondary party knew that the act was 
imminently dangerous and would in all probability cause death”. 
46 [1972–1974] SLR 73. 
47 [1972–1974] SLR 73 at [25]. 
48 [1972–1974] SLR 73 at [25]. 
49 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [175]. 
50 Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal 
knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of the persons who joins 
in the act with such knowledge or intention, is liable for the act in the same manner 
as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention. 
(2009) 21 SAcLJ Common Intention 569 
 
(b) Sections 11151 and 11352 of the Penal Code, two 
provisions concerning abetment, are otiose if Mimi Wong v PP 
is correct. The existence of a common intention to commit a 
primary offence is at least abetment by conspiracy or 
intentional aiding. If the mens rea required to hold secondary 
offenders liable for the collateral offence is either negligence or 
recklessness, then this is also aptly covered by ss 111 and 113. If 
the actus reus required is participation in the collateral offence, 
then the abetment provisions will once again be satisfied since 
participation in the collateral offence must be abetment of the 
collateral offence.53 
35 The court examined briefly the jurisprudence in India and 
Malaysia and concluded that neither jurisdiction yielded convincing 
accounts on this aspect of s 34.54 It decided that it needed to delve into 
the historical underpinnings of s 34 to determine if Professor Hor’s 
objections were valid. Its conclusion was that Mimi Wong v PP was 
correct, as justified by the following points: 
(a) In Lord Macaulay’s original draft Indian Penal Code, 
there was no equivalent of s 34 as it exists today but there was a 
clause very similar to the present s 35.55 However, the 
illustrations to that clause demonstrated that there was no 
contemplation of a common intention. Accordingly, s 35 applies 
to a situation where there is no common intention.56 
(b) In Lord Macaulay’s final draft, the then s 34 did not 
contain the expression “in furtherance of the common intention 
of all”. The expression was added much later, in consequence of 
                                                                       
51 When a act is abetted and a different one is done, the abettor is liable for the act 
done, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if he had directly abetted it: 
provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was 
committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance 
of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment. 
52 When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a 
particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the 
abetment causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is 
liable for the effect caused, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if he had 
abetted the act with the intention of the causing that effect, provided he knew that 
the act abetted was likely to cause that effect. 
53 Michael Hor, “Common Intention and the Enterprise of Constructing Criminal 
Liability” (1999) Sing JLS 494 at 509. 
54 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [182]–[187]. 
55 Wherever the causing of a certain effect with a certain intention, or with a 
knowledge of certain circumstances, is an offence, it is to be understood that if 
more persons than one jointly cause that effect, every one of them who has that 
intention, or that knowledge, commits that offence. 
56 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [189]–[190] and [213]–[215]. 
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either one or both of two Indian cases,57 The Queen v Gorachand 
Gope58 and Ganesh Singh v Ram Raja.59 
(c) Before this expression was added, English and Indian 
law differed on liability for common intention. Under the latter, 
a person, even though not party to the evil intent of his 
companions, could be held liable for murder. The present s 34 
was enacted (in 1870) to incorporate into the Penal Code the 
English law doctrine of common purpose.60 
(d) Common purpose, as it stood in 1870, was confronted 
with various approaches: (i) objective foresight; (ii) subjective 
knowledge; and (iii) actual intention to hold the secondary 
offender liable in a twin crime situation. However, on a further 
inspection of Lord Macaulay’s drafts, he clearly intended to 
impute only a subjective knowledge test to the Indian Penal 
Code for the doctrine of common purpose. Sections 111 and 
113 should be read similarly to embody a subjective knowledge 
approach.61 
(e) Although ss 34 and 35 are similarly worded, the 
historical underpinnings of s 34 mean that the better reading 
would be that s 35 applies to situations where there is no 
common intention. The words “in furtherance of the common 
intention of all” showed the intent of the Legislature to use s 34, 
rather than s 35, to give expression to the doctrine of common 
purpose in the Penal Code. Moreover, the predecessor to s 35 – 
cl 3 of the (draft) Indian Penal Code – clearly supports the 
argument that s 35 was intended to apply in the absence of a 
common intention.62 
(f) Section 107(b) contemplates an abetment where the 
principal and the abettor are not clearly defined; when this is 
read with ss 111 and 113, a s 34 type of situation is seen. 
Therefore, there would be no injustice in interpreting s 34 as 
requiring no less than ss 111 and 113; both provisions give 
effect to the doctrine of common purpose.63 
(g) The argument that s 34 should be reserved for intended 
consequences and the abetment provisions for unintended 
consequences is flatly contradicted by s 109 of the Penal Code. 
Section 109 covers the situation where there must be the 
                                                                       
57 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [191]–[193]. 
58 (1866) Bengal LR Supp 443 at 456. 
59 (1869) 3 Bengal LR 44 at 46. 
60 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [194]–[195]. 
61 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [196]–[212]. 
62 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [213]–[215]. 
63 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [216]–[217]. 
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intention to commit the offence committed, viz, the Rex v 
Vincent Banka64 situation. If the abetment provisions cover such 
a situation, it would not be correct to state that s 34 is reserved 
for such a situation.65 
36 The court’s counter-arguments are compelling but two further 
comments can be made. First, complicity by aiding and abetting are 
conceptually very distinct from complicity by joint enterprise. This 
much is true for many of the major Commonwealth jurisdictions.66 Any 
interpretation of s 34 that renders it indistinguishable from aiding and 
abetting should therefore be avoided. Secondly, s 3867 of the Penal Code 
could have been discussed by the court to provide valuable dicta, given 
that it is now clear that all the joint enterprise provisions are 
conceptually contiguous. Section 38 basically states that several persons 
engaged in the commission of a criminal act may be guilty of different 
offences – and be affixed with different grades of responsibility.68 The 
question is what role does s 38 now play? It has been suggested before 
that ss 34 and 35 apply where the accomplice joins in the criminal act 
and has the mens rea, whereas s 38 applies (as a “backup” provision) 
where the accomplice does not have the same mens rea.69 Lee Chez Kee v 
PP implicitly refutes this suggestion, but more could have been said. 
E. In furtherance of the common intention 
37 The remaining issue for the court to address was when it can be 
said that the collateral offence is in furtherance of the common 
intention:70 
[I]f the mens rea required of the secondary offenders is not that of the 
collateral offence, what is the additional mens rea that is required then, 
apart from the mens rea to commit the criminal act constituting the 
primary offence? 
38 While it was clear that Mimi Wong v PP did not require 
secondary offenders to possess any of the mens rea for the collateral 
offence, the additional mens rea required vis-à-vis the likelihood of the 
collateral offence happening remained ambiguous. Academics have 
pointed out before that the idea that the collateral offence must be 
                                                                       
64 [1936] MLJ 53. 
65 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [218]. 
66 See A P Simester, “The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 LQR 578 at 
594–598. 
67 Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal 
act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act. 
68 PP v Lee Chin Guan [1992] 1 SLR 320 at [45]. 
69 Gillian Douglas, “Joint Liability in the Penal Code” (1983) 25 Mal LR 259 at 262–263. 
70 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [175]. 
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“consistent” with the carrying out of the common intention of the 
parties was not very helpful.71 Compounding this problem was that cases 
after Mimi Wong v PP took widely differing positions on the required 
mens rea. The following provides a sampling: 
(a) Shaiful Edham bin Adam v PP took the “subjective 
foresight” approach, viz, the participants must have some 
knowledge that an act may be committed which is consistent 
with, or would be in furtherance of, the common intention.72 
(b) PP v Tan Lay Heong held that the collateral crime must 
be something that was “either contemplated or done ordinarily 
in furtherance of a common intention” to commit the primary 
crime.73 
(c) PP v Too Yin Sheong effectively adopted the strict 
liability approach, viz, “so long as the doer of the act had done 
the act in furtherance of the common intention of all of them, 
then the liability of that act automatically extends to the rest of 
the secondary offenders”.74 
(d) Asogan Ramesh s/o Ramachandran v PP took a purely 
strict liability approach.75 
39 Ultimately, the court held that the mens rea required of the 
secondary offender is that he must subjectively know that one in his 
party may likely commit the criminal act constituting the collateral 
offence in furtherance of the common intention of carrying out the 
primary offence; there is no need to have known of the actual method of 
execution in a murder situation.76 This approach would be consistent 
with the UK77 and Australian78 approach, as well as the current judicial 
interpretation79 of the common object provision in the Penal Code 
(s 149).80 
                                                                       
71 Eg, Yeo, Morgan & Chan, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 
2007) at para 35.38. 
72 [1999] 2 SLR 57 at [57]. 
73 [1996] 2 SLR 150 at [46]. 
74 [1998] SGHC 286 at [119]–[121] and [132]. 
75 [1998] 1 SLR 286 at [35]. 
76 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [236]–[253]. 
77 Eg, Regina v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 at 27. The UK position was recently restated and 
reaffirmed by the House of Lords in R v Rahman [2009] 1 AC 129. 
78 Eg, Clayton v R (2006) 231 ALR 500. 
79 PP v Fazely bin Rahmat [2003] 2 SLR 184. 
80 If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution 
of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly 
knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, 
at the time of committing of that offence is a member of the same assembly, is 
guilty of that offence. 
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40 The foundations upon which this restatement of the law is built 
are difficult to assail. Indeed, as the court said,81 “by forming a joint 
enterprise, the accessory perpetrates an independent and discrete 
wrong, and the collusion justifies the extension of liability of the 
principal’s crime on the accessory for what is said to be a reduced mens 
rea of subjective knowledge”.82 Indeed, it is submitted that the 
imposition of the requirement of subjective knowledge would allow for 
the perception that the secondary offender is being held liable for 
recklessness. The secondary offender who subjectively knows that one in 
his party may likely commit the criminal act constituting the collateral 
offence can be interpreted as having turned a blind eye to the obvious. 
This is akin to recklessness, which has been described as “the deliberate 
acceptance of a risk actually foreseen”.83 In this respect, it has been said 
that, in general, no accused should be convicted “for any act or omission 
or for bringing about any prohibited state of affairs unless he is morally 
blameworthy”.84 Moral blameworthiness can be conceptualised to be a 
state of mind of the accused as opposed to the state of mind of the 
reasonable man.85 There are two states of mind which can be said to be 
morally blameworthy. These would be intention and recklessness.86 The 
approach taken by the court vis-à-vis the mens rea required of the 
secondary offender would therefore allow the morally guilty to be 
punished, rather than to merely impose legal guilt. 
41 To round up this analysis, one statement which was quoted 
earlier is referred to, viz, “it is certainly inequitable from the offender’s 
point of view, if he has to be put in peril of a conviction of murder for 
participating in a crime without contemplating the possibility of a 
killing in the course of it”.87 On the court’s express imposition of the 
requirement that the secondary offender subjectively knows that one in 
his party may likely commit the criminal act constituting the collateral 
offence, the fears of such inequitable convictions should be put to rest. 
Only the morally guilty, viz, those who are guilty according to their state 
of mind, will be convicted from henceforth. 
VI. Conclusion 
42 Lee Chez Kee v PP is a welcome decision with its thoroughness 
and logic in its analyses. Further questions will surely be asked in due 
                                                                       
81 Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR 447 at [250]. 
82 Citing A P Simester, “The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 LQR 578 at 599. 
83 G H Gordon, “Subjective and Objective Mens Rea” (1974–1975) 17 CLQ 355 at 355. 
84 G H Gordon, “Subjective and Objective Mens Rea” (1974–1975) 17 CLQ 355 at 355. 
85 G H Gordon, “Subjective and Objective Mens Rea” (1974–1975) 17 CLQ 355 at 355. 
86 G H Gordon, “Subjective and Objective Mens Rea” (1974–1975) 17 CLQ 355 at 355. 
87 M Sornarajah, “Common Intention and Murder under the Penal Codes” (1995) 
Sing JLS 29 at 32. 
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course,88 but Lee Chez Kee v PP has largely disambiguated the proper 
interpretation of s 34 – an interpretation that arguably strikes the right 
balance in ascertaining individual criminal responsibility in group 
crimes. 
 
                                                                       
88 Further guidance by the Court of Appeal on how s 34 applies in relation to murder 
under s 300(c) of the Penal Code Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed may be in the offing, as 
appeals have been filed against the High Court decisions of PP v Daniel Vijay s/o 
Katherasan [2008] SGHC 120 and PP v Ismil bin Kadar [2009] SGHC 84. 
